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It is often claimed or assumed that intellectual property laws are necessary to
encourage individual creativity and inventiveness and that society would be worse
off without such laws. This article suggests that, in the field of copyrights and
patents at least, such claims rest on myth and paradox rather than proof, and
should be viewed sceptically. With its minimal standards for eligibility, copyright
today seems less concerned with authors, art and literature than with protecting
the distributors of standardized industrial products, and sometimes is even used
to prevent the dissemination of knowledge by becoming a tool ofcensorship. Patent
law too requires major rethinking if itspromise ofbettering mankind by encouraging
socially useful discoveries and inventions and the dissemination of knowledge is
to be realized The article concludes that intellectual property laws should no longer
be analyzed in terms ofoutmoded notions ofproperty: moreparticularistic inquiries
are needed to ensure that these laws adequately serve valid social ends
On a souvent prétendu ou présumé que le droit sur la propriété intellectuelle était
nécessaire parce qu'il encourageait la créativité et l'esprit d'invention chez les
particuliers et que la société pâtirait de leur absence. Dans cet article l'auteur
suggère que, du moins dans le domaine des droits d'auteur et des brevets, de
telles assertions reposentsur des mythes ou desparadoxesplutôtque sur despreuves
solides et qu'il serait bon de les voir d'un oeil sceptique. A cause des normes
minimum d'éligibilité, les droits d'auteur semblent aujourd'hui avoir moins trait
aux auteurs, à l'art et à la litérature qu'à la protection des distributeurs de produits
industriels standardisés et qu'ils serventparfois à bloquer la dissémination du savoir
et à devenir l'outil de la censure. Le droit des brevets lui aussi a besoin d'une
refonte importante pour contribuer à l'amélioration de l'humanité, comme il le
prome4 en encourageant les découvertes et inventions utiles à la société et la
dissémination du savoir. L'auteur en conclut que le temps est révolu où le droit
sur la propriété intellectuelle était considéré en termes de notions de propriété
maintenant dépassées, ilfaut s'engager dans des recherches plus spécifiques pour
s'assurer que ce droit mène à des résultats sociaux valables
* David Vaver, of Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, Ontario.
This article is an expanded and updated version of a publicLansdowne lecture delivered
on February 9, 1989, at the University of Victoria, B.C., and the keynote address at the
conference "Who Owns Knowledge?" held on February 10 and 11, 1989, under the auspices
of the Faculty of Law at the University of Victoria . An abridged version appears in (1990),
I.P.J.
I acknowledge my colleague Professor Reuben Hasson's kindness in regularly supplying
me, over the years, with newspaper clippings and relevant material on intellectual property,
and for commenting usefully on the draft of the manuscript I showed him some time
after the lecture had been presented.
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Introduction
What is intellectual property law? The phrase is a shorthand tag-and
like all such tags, somewhat misleading-for a diverse range of legal areas:
copyright law (the archetype of "intellectual property") and a set of subjects
that shade from intellectual into "industrial property" as the interests they
protect look less creative and more like business assets-design rights,
patents, trademarks, and the various business wrongs that go under the
head of "unfair competition" . Under this last rubric come such acts as
luring away a rival's employees in breach of their contracts of employment
("inducing breach of contract" or "conspiracy"), trading in a way that
might mislead people into believing that they are dealing with another
firm or buying someone else's products ("passing off'), stealing a rival's
trade secrets ("breach ofconfidence"), telling false stories aboutacompetitor
so that customers are less inclined to deal with it ("injurious falsehood"),
and so on.'
The reasons why legal protection is extended to intellectual property
are not entirely clear or convincing. Theorists have identified both moral
and economic motivations?
Morally, a person is said to have a natural right to the product of
her brain; alternatively, society is obliged to reward persons to the extent
that they have produced something useful for society: as one sows, so
should one reap .3 But these arguments fail to make the case . We know
that ideas are not protected once they leave the creator's brain and, when
society does protect ideas after they have taken some concrete shape, the
protection is always limited in time and space. The logic flowing from
a concept of natural rights, that ideas should be protected in perpetuity
and throughout the world, has never been accepted by even the most
1 Retired publisher Jack McClelland is reported as having once said of copyright
law-and he would no doubt have said the same of intellectual property generally-that
it is "the most boring subject known to man": Hugh Winsor, Despite furor, Senate may
be doing its job on copyright law, Globe & Mail, April 11, 1988, p. A2. Put boredom,
as the poet Auden tells us, is a subjective reaction, Edward Mendelson (ed.), W.H . Auden:
Collected Poems (1976), p. 16.
2 Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent Sytem (1958), Study #15 of
the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the U.S . Senate Committee
on the Judiciary (85th Cong., 2d Sess .), p. 21 ff., discusses these theories in relation to
patents . For similar arguments and a critique in the context of copyright, see S. Breyer,
The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study ofCopyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer
Programs (1970), 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281. Most recently, Edwin Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual
Property (1989), 18 Philosophy & Public Affairs 32, concludes, at p. 52, that the institutions
of intellectual property "are not so obviously or easily justified as many people think".
3 This shades into the materialist argument that only good ideas are worth good money,
to which John Ruskin for one subscribed . "Ruskin liked making money . . . mainly because
healthy profits showed his critics that his theories and ideas were more practicable than
they had supposed": Brian Maidment, John Ruskin, George Allen and American Pirated
Books (1981), 9 Publishing History 5, at p. 7.
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ardent promoters of a strict intellectual property regime. Nor, if social
reward is the criterion, can we say exactly what services deserve what
reward. Does a pulp novelist read by millions merit as much as the inventor
of insulin, even if readers are shown to need the pulp for their sustenance
as much as a diabetic needs insulin to survive? And why should a patent
or copyright be the appropriate reward? Isaac Newton could get no patent
for the principle of gravity, yet his idea proved more socially useful over
time than the finest Stephen King thriller, for which society thinks fit to
award King or his assignee a copyright for the author's life plus fifty years.
And who gets the monopoly right where two or more persons invent
something independently, without knowing of the other's work, is often
more a matter ofluck than anything else : the history ofscience and invention
suggests that the phenomenon of simultaneous discovery is the rule, not
the exception.4
On the economic plane, patents and copyrights are supposed to
encourage work to be disclosed to the public and thus to increase society's
pool of ideas and knowledge. Yet many inventions are kept secret and
the law rigorously protects that decision, whether or not disclosure would
be more socially useful than secrecy . And copyright law, too, allows the
creator not to publish his or her work and shades offinto a tool ofcensorship.
At amore basic level, intellectual property regimes are said to encourage
the initial creative act. Yet, in the centuries before copyright and patent
laws were established or rigorously enforced, inventive and creative work
flourished . And .if the British patent law of 1624 really did encourage
greater inventiveness, why did the Industrial Revolution take some 150
years more to arrive? A law with this time lag suggests a lack of, or
at least a serious discrepancy between, cause and effect. In any event,
today much creative and inventive work is carried out by employees, who
are motivated to work by incentives other than patents or copyrights.
The strongest economic argument is utilitarian : without copyright or
patents, much research and creativity would not be carried on or financed
by firms.s But this is only partly true . No doubt, less such activity would
4 Robert Merton, The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations
(1973), p. 356. The point was judicially recognized in Kewanee Oil v. Bicron (1974),
416 U.S . 470, at pp. 490-491 : "If something is to be discovered at all very likely it will
be discovered by more than one person . . . . Even were an inventor to keep his discovery
completely to himself, . . . there is a high probability that it will soon be independently
discovered."
5 See, e.g., Peter Karlen, Worldmaking: Property Rights in Aesthetic Creations (1986),
45 Jo . of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 183, at p. 185: "intellectual property rights . . .
were developed to promote investment" in three types oflabour: inventorship, workmanship,
and authorship. Earlier, Karlen points out, ibid., at p. 183, the pervasive character of these
rights: "It is extraordinary that almost all man-made objects in this aesthetic environment
are actually or potentially subject to intellectual property laws ."
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occur-but hove much less, and in what areas? 6 It seems impossible to
argue that the current laws encourage just the right amount of research,
creativity and financing, and just in the right areas.? In any event, this
fails to make the case for intellectual property. For if the allocation of
these property rights is simply a means to an end, namely, to make the
fruits of creativity and research available to users, then one must ask if
the means is the most effective wayto that end. Ifthe rights restrict availability
and use more than they increase it, they are unjustifiable; if the converse,
one must ask if there are better means of increasing availability and use,
either by modifying the rights or by finding alternative means.$
A more disputable theory is propounded by Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function
of the Patent System (1977), 20 Jo . Law & Econ. 265, that patent law gives an inventor
the right to develop a prospect and to protect the innovation flowingfrom the basic invention:
cf., Roger Beck, The Prospect Theory of the Patent System and Unproductive Competition
(1983), 5 Research in Law & Economics 193 ; see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S .
519, at p. 536 (1966), ("a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the
search, but compensation for its successful conclusion") .
6 Recall that the motion picture industry, which now relies mainly on copyrights,
contracts and (increasingly) trademarks to protect the exploitation of its products, in the
beginning protected itself with patent pools over the equipment and processes, without
which the patentees argued "no business could be conducted" : Janet Staiger : Mass-produced
photoplays: economic and signifying practices in the first years of Hollywood, in Paul
Kerr (ed.), The Hollywood Film Industry (1986), p. 97, at pp. 102-103 . But, as -we know,
the business could and did flourish without patent protection.
7 Recognizing the "skewing" effect of intellectual property regimes, one writer has
argued that judges themselves should expand the protection given to ideas by developing
a tort of misappropriation wherever (a) a firm has substantially invested in an innovation;
(b) another has "appropriated" it; and (c) that other has used it to compete with the
first: C . Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation Doctrine:
Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation (1987), 2 High Technology L.J.
55, at pp . 69-72 .
Judges may already be doing this, albeit erratically, whenever they "stretch" common
law principles: see, e.g., Franklin v. Giddins, [1978] Qd . R. 72 (S.C.), creating an attenuated
plant patent through trade secret law . U.S . state judges already have a misappropriation
tort in their common law arsenal : see, e.g., Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v.
Dow Jones & Co. Inc., 456 N.E. 2d 84 (IIl . S .C ., 1983). Most British Commonwealth
courts have, so far, resisted the temptation to create one eo nomine: see, e.g., Associated
Newspapers PLC v . Insert Media Ltd, [1988] 1 W.L.R . 509 (Ch . D.) and Wesfair Food
Ltd v . Jim Pattison Industries Ltd (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 46, at p . 65 (B.C .S .C .), the
spirited attack on any notion of an unfair competition tort in Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd
v. Philip Morris Ltd (1984), 56 A.L.R . 193, at pp . 210-214 (Aunt. H.C .), and the striking
down ofa statutory attemptto enactoneas beyond federal competence in Canada : MacDonald
v. Vapour Can. Ltd, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 1 ; cf., Archibold v.
CF.A.®., [1966] Ghana L.R. 79 (H.C.), accepting an American-style common law tort
of misappropriation to protect oral music from unauthorized recording and Vidéotron Ltée
c. Industrie Microlec Produits Électroniques Inc., [1988] R.J.Q. 546 (C.S.), holding the
supply of television signal decoders to be unfair competition actionable by affected pay-
television cable companies, contrary to Article 1053 of the Civil Code.
8 Hettinger, loc . cit., footnote 2, p . 49.
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Yet, when all is said and done, Western capitalist societies are highly
property-orientated, and entrenched ideas of property drive their reactions
to many market activities . But their views are not consistent . Some things
are stigmatized as amounting to unfairly riding on others' coat-tails ; other
things are not. No bright line can be drawn a priori between the morally
(or legally) permissible and impermissible, and where the line is in fact
drawn varies considerably from country to country.
I propose to look particularly at copyright and patent law to see
how far they serve or can be made to serve useful purposes in society.
I shall deal only incidentally with trademarks, unfair competition or designs
law, but much of what follows may be relevant to those areas as well.
I . Copyright
If I create a literary, musical, dramatic or artistic work, I automatically
have a copyright in it. (In some countries, I must mark the work with
a copyright notice and record it in a public registry, but this formality
is internationally on the decline.) I can stop anyone else from copying
my work or doing other things with it, such as translating, broadcasting,
making a sound recording of it, or perhaps including it in an electronic
database. My right lasts for my lifetime plus another fifty years, so that
my heirs can benefit from the fruits of my creativity. If a person in France
copies my work there, I can stop his doing that; and, equally, a French
person can stop a foreigner copying a French work in a foreign country.
This look morally right, does it not? Here is a law that must encourage
people to do creative things and to profit from their creativity . Society
will benefit because our minds and souls will be exposed to the humanizing
influence of the world's greatest thinkers, and those of us lucky enough
to be creative will be inspired in new directions : for even a pygmy standing
on the shoulders of a giant can see further than the giant .
But, upon examination, the theory dissolves into mythology .
A. Are Copyrights andPatents Designed to ProtectAuthors andInventors?
The first myth is that copyright law is designed to protect authors.
In locating itself around the central character of the author (a term that
encompasses the whole range of creative persons: artists, composers,
playwrights, novelists, poets, and so on), copyright law is politically astute .
The mere mention of authors, artists or composers connotes certain things
to us . We think of the stereotypical author in his garret, a tragic sort
of person driven by his muse: of Beethoven, continuing deafly to conduct
one of his symphonies without realizing that the orchestra had already
reached the end of the piece and had stopped; of Oscar Wilde, the brilliant
aesthete with a fatal flaw ; of Emile Zola, with a social conscience greater
than his discretion. We each have a personal list of favourites . Surely
anything that we as a society can do to encourage the noble professions
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of letters and drama and the muse of music, we should do . Like the rest
of us, artists have to live and eat. Is not the copyright law there for them?9
Let us move from the garret, where such creators by tradition work,
to the basement, where the inventor tinkers.l 0 What of the inventor driven
to invent, to produce something of value to humankind: the Marie Curies
perfecting X-ray technology?" Should they not be encouraged? Should
9 See, e.g., Barbara A. Ringer (then U.S . Copyrights Register), in the Demonology
of Copyright (1974), p. 6: "Perhaps one of the problems with copyright is that some
people have elevated it to a sanctified or divine plane, and that authors have been looked
on as saints or angels, if not demi-gods." Proceeding to argue for enhanced copyright
protection, Ringer falls into the very trap she attributes to others, of romanticizing and
privileging individual creativity (ibid., pp . 18-19) : "the most important copyright goal of
all [is] a substantial increase in the rights of the author, considered not as a copyright
owner but as a separate creative individual . It involves a recognition that committees don't
create works and corporations don't create works, and machines don't create works. . . .
If the copyright law is to continue to function on the side of light against darkness, good
against evil, truth against newspeak, it must broaden its bases and its goals." Cf., footnote
90, infra .
Note that the lionization of authors is a comparatively recent Western phenomenon,
still resisted in many Oriental societies which subordinate the author's identity and ego
to the work itself, Joseph Campbell, Myths to Live By (1972), p. 108. A recent trend
ofWestern literary criticism mimics Oriental thinking by treating the work as a self-contained
text, independent of the author's personality and intentions : see Roland Barthes' essay,
The Death of the Author, in his Images-Music-Text (1977), p. 142. Michel Foucault in
his essay, What is an Author?, makes the point that, historically, works first needed authors
so that penalties could be effectively imposed for prohibited discourse such as blasphemy
and sedition . Later, in the 18th century, as works become objects of appropriation under
copyright regimes, the author acquired a new status "at the moment he was accepted
into the socialorder ofproperty which governs our culture", M. Foucault, Language, Counter-
Memory, Practice . (1977), p. 113, at pp . 124-125. 1 am indebted to my friend George
Klippert for alerting me to this line of inquiry .
10 This, by the way, is the easiest way to demarcate copyright from patents : copyright
protects persons whowork in garrets, patents protect those who work in basements. Workers
such as computer programmers, who create matter that could fall either under copyrights
or patents, are more difficult to site : unless consigned to limbo, they might be located
in a ground floor study, close to a washroom. Geniuses such as Leonardo da Vinci would
today need a moving stairway to keep carrying them between floors .
Concepts of authorship, industrial design, basic research, and applied science and
technology are of course variable social constructs, and the many attempts to define them
invariably for legal purposes fail, if not at the centre then at the margin. However, our
legal system preserves and reinforces the phenomenon of the two solitudes of art and
science, no doubt subdivided into further solitudes, eloquently decried by C.P. Snow in
his 1959 Rede lecture, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, in C.P . Snow,
Public Affairs (1971), p. 13 ; see also, The Two Cultures : A Second Look, ibid., p. 47.
11 Not all inventors have the public image of Marie Curie. Commenting on the United
States inventor, G. Lewett notes : "The inventor frequently appears as eccentric, single-
minded, and so focused on his technology that he seems emotionally and mentally unstable
. . . Shying away from the popular image as an `eccentric', [inventors] usually prefer some
acceptable occupational title: engineer, technician, salesman, dentist, or whatever": Fostering
General Awareness of the Importance of Inventiveness, [1986] Industrial Property 233,
234.
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we not have a patent system to give them the small solace of a seventeen-
year monopoly when they produce that elusive thing that will contribute
to our improved material benefit?
A myth is a powerful idea. It is something we cling to. It has a
kernel of truth, and it is this kernel that is frequently universalized as
the great truth. But it remains a myth because it is true only at the margin .
And yet it tends to overwhelm our senses to the exclusion of reality.
And so it seems with copyrights and patents . Since the onset of
industrialization, the individual creator and inventor have been pushed to
the sidelines . Most creative and inventive work is not done by individuals ;
it is done by teams, and the creativity and inventiveness is part of a process
designed to put a product on the market . Occasionally, the creativity is
that of the team itself. More often, it is directed by the firm that employs
the team . Most copyrights and patents belong not to their individual creators
and inventors but to the firms that employ them.I2
One can go further. Copyright law did not grow up to protect authors.
There were indeed some big names13 associated with the first copyright
statute, the Statute of Anne of 1710 . But consider how Lord Camden
described the scene surrounding the passage of the Statute:I4
In the year 1708 [they] came up to parliament in the form of petitioners, with
tears in their eyes, hopeless and forlorn; they brought with them their wives and
children to excite compassion, and induce parliament to grant them a statutory security .
They obtained the Act. And again and again sought for a further legislative security .
Who were "they"? Authors? No. It was the stationers, the publishers
and retailers of books of the day, of whom Camden speaks .I 5 Eighteenth
century authors were not one wit better off in Britain after the Statute
than they were before. Nor were they in the nineteenth century. Superstars
like Charles Dickens could rail against the American pirates on their United
12 Most states retain the pretence that the employed author or inventor matters by
granting her that status but by proceeding to vest ownership of the product in the employer .
Other states dispense even with this charade. Thus, United States copyright law holds
that the person or entity who employs another to create works "for hire", typically an
employee but sometimes even an independent contractor, is not merely the copyright owner
(as is the position in most other countries) but also the work's author. see Copyright
Act 1976, 17 U.S.C. s. 201(b), repeating a similar provision in the 1909 U.S. Act; cf.,
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989). In patent law
too, both capitalist states (for example, Spain andArgentina) and socialist states (for example,
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia), sometimes allow corporations to organize their activities
sothat individual inventorship is obscured and any patent is issued directly to the corporation:
Berndt Godenhielm, Employee Inventions, ch . 7 in 14 International Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law (Copyright and Industrial Property), pp. 7-228 ff.
13 For example, Swift, Defoe, Addison and Steele .
14 Donaldson v. Becket (1774, H.L.), reprinted in The Literary Property Debates: Six
Tracts 1764-1774 (1975), Part F, p. 48, at p. 50 .
15 The story is well told by John Feather, The Book Trade in Politics: The Making
of the Copyright Act of 1710 (1980), 8 Publishing History 19 .
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States lecture tours, and Mark Twain could appear before -a House of
Lords select committee, arguing for perpetual copyright.16 But, for every
Mark Twain and Charles Dickens, there were 998 other writers for whom
copyright and copyright reform were irrelevant. A British literary historian
of this period states why he does not bother to mention copyright in his
narrative:
The various copyright acts and international treaties . . . made very little difference
to the lives of ordinary writers. The extension of the copyright period under the
Acts of 1814 and 1842 for example, had no effect on the majority of . writers because
they rarely owned the copyright of their books. Publishers, however, did benefit;
they were given more time in which to exhaust the copyrights they had bought
from their authors. James Grant sold the copyrights of his popular historical novels
to Routledge for between £100 and £250 a time . Between 1856 and 1882 Routledge
sold 100,000 copies ofGrant's Romance of bear. no wonder Grantdescribedauthorship
as a "hopeless treadmill" . 17
So, too, might have Edward Lear, who sold the copyrights of his Book
of Nonsense for £125, and saw it go to nineteen editions in his lifetime
without his getting a single penny more in royalties.18
Have things changed all that much? To some extent, yes: outright
transfers of copyright in some industries have been replaced by royalty
contracts, so that there is a steady flow, though more often a trickle down,
to the author. But how many full-time self-employed writers are there
who rely for their living on the copyright system? Just over a decade
ago, one commentator put the figure at 300 in the United States . 19 The
16 This is amusing, since Mark Twain made his literary reputation with the story
of The Notorious Jumping Frog of Calaveras County, only to be told some time later
that it was an ancient Greek tale, The Athenian and the Frog . Admitting the "exact
resemblances", Twain claimed that "it must be a case of history actually repeating itself,
and not a case of a good story floating down the ages and surviving because too good
to be allowed to perish". See Charles Neider (ed.), The Complete Humorous Sketches
andTales ofMark Twain (1961), pp. 623-628. As they say, tell it to thejudge. Cryptomnesia,
or unconscious plagiarism, is a far more common phenomenon than many may realize :
see Merton, op. cit., footnote 4, pp . 402 ff. Technically, it may constitute copyright
infringement : Francis Day & Hunter Ltd v. Bron, [1963] Ch. 587 (C.A .) .
p- 5.
17 Nigel Cross, The Common Writer: Life in Nineteenth Century Grub Street (1985),
18 vivien Noakes, Edward Lear (1985), p. 155.
19 John Tebbel, The Book Business in the USA, in David Daiches and Anthony
Thorlby (eds .), The Modern World: Reactions (1976), vol. 3, p. 523, at p. 533. Tebbel
indicates that another ten million were "trying" to earn their living by writing. A Canadian
study, presumably relying on different criteria, suggests that in 1978 about 950 freelancers
wrote full-time, but that fully 62% of them earned under $10,000 a year from their writing
and the median income was only $7,000! See B.R. Harrison and J.R. Thera, Economic
Status of Canadian Freelance Writers, in W.S . Hendon and J.L. Shanahan, Economics
of Cultural Decisions (1983), pp. 145-146. See also James Hepburn, The Author's Empty
Purse and the Rise of the Literary Agent (1968), p. 100 ff., stating that half the full-
time writers surveyed in England in the mid 1960s earned less than the minimum pay
of a bus driver, and that even the "most prolific and business like" major writer earned
less than the literary agent he or she employed.
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number cannot have grown much since, despite the occasional literary
agent who manages, with amaximum of self-promotional fanfare, to extract
a multi-million dollar advance for an author from a publisher for book
and film rights . There are not very many authors like DanRoss, the Canadian
who reportedly makes $100,000 a year from his career as a Harlequin
Romance writer. But then, few writers have written as many books as
Ross: 327 in twenty-five years, with forty million copies sold.
Even so-called "moral rights", which extend to authors the right to
have their work properly credited and maintained intact, have given authors
cold comfort in practice . True, in Canada, the United States and France,
authors have won some much publicized victories. In Canada, Michael
Snow stopped the Eaton Centre from bedecking his Canada geese sculpture
with Christmas wreaths;2° in the United States, Monty Python stopped
the ABC network from rebroadcasting a chopped-up version of their
television show;2l and in France (but not North America), "colourizing"
films for television viewing was temporarily slowed down by litigation
over the monochrome film, The Asphalt Jungle, directed by John Huston22
But, in Canada, even with an express moral rights law, authors have failed
in virtually every case other than Michael Snow's and, now that the 1988
amendments to the Canadian copyright law expressly allow moral rights
to be waived,23 we may expect the practice long adopted in the United
States film industry of standard form blanket waivers to become general
'-0 Snow v. The Eaton Centre (1982), 70 C.P.R . (2d) 105 (Ont. H.C .) . For comment,
see David Vaver, Snow v. The Eaton Centre: Wreaths on Sculpture Prove Accolade for
Artists' Moral Rights (1983), 8 Can. Bus. L.J . 81; David Vaver, Authors' Moral Rights:
Reform Proposals in Canada: Charter or Barter of Rights for Creators? (1987), 25 Osgoode
Hall L.J . 749.
History, like art, has a habit of repeating itself. In 1903, the King Edward Hotel
in Toronto wanted some paintings in its lobby livened up because they were thought
too sombre. Claiming the changes would ruin his professional reputation, the artist obtained
an interlocutory injunction to prevent his work being tampered with, even though the
hotel owned it: Dodge v. Allied Arts Co. (1903), 14 Copyright Office Bull . 776 (N.Y .
Sup. Ct .) .
21 Gilliam v. A.B.C., 538 F. 2d I (C.A . 2, 1976). Cf., the Belgian case of a grimly
realist adaptation of Franz Lehar's operetta "The Merry Widow", which was said to infringe
the moral rights ofthe author's successors . However, no injunction to stop the performances
was granted, and only token damages of one franc were awarded: Franz van Isacker,
Letter from Belgium, [1967] Copyright 135.
22 Soc. dexploitation de la Cinquième Chaine 'Ea Cinq" c. Consorts Huston, Rec.
Dalloz Sir. No . 31 (Sep. 29, 1988), I.R . 227. On July 6, 1989, the Cour d'appel de
Paris reversed a lower court injunction banning the exhibition of the colourized film, on
the ground that under U.S. law, the film's "author" was the film production company,
not Huston, and that French public policy did not prevent Huston ceding his moral rights
to the company. The case is subject to further appeal . See M. Landau, Colourization,
Copyright and Moral Rights: A U.S . Perspective (1990), 5 I.P.J. 215, at p. 246 ff.
23 CopyrightAmendment Act, S.C.1988, c.15, s. 4, inserting news.12.1(2) (renumbered
as s. 14 .1(2)) into the Copyright Act R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 .
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contracting behaviour throughout North America in all dealings with creative
people.
In any event, social patterns of conduct frequently overwhelm legal
rights. Is there not a deep irony in -the fact that much of John Stuart
Mill's autobiography was in fact the work of his wife, Harriet, whose
moral rights as co-author the great philosopher did not think fit to
acknowledge formally?24 With the strongest moral rights regime in the
world, would Harriet likely have compelled John Stuart to put her up
there with him on the title page?
B. Does Copyright Law Encourage Art andLiterature?
The second great myth is that copyright law encourages the creation
of works of art and literature. This would be true if only such works
were granted copyright. But the law does not require that a work have
any merit or, indeed, that it be much of a work at all . This view has
much to commend it: we cannot fashion a system that grants copyright
only to works of high art or literature . Who is to judge greatness: a court
comprising lawyers? The last thing we need are lawyers giving us the
benefit of their views on aesthetics and literary criticism.25 So. we avoid
this, wherever possible, by withdrawing such criteria from the judges and
giving them something objective with which to work.
This course, however, leads to the arts and literature being trivialized
and ultimately overwhelmed. As for artistic work, we are told that "artistic"
refers to the means of. expression-drawing, engraving, sculpting, and the
like. It is not used in any fine arts sense26 One judge, perhaps thinking
of his own artistic talents, has said, in all seriousness, that anything more
elaborate than "a single straight line drawn with the aid of a ruler" qualifies
24 Fred Stillinger, Who Wrote J.S . Mill's Autobiography? (1983), 27 Victorian Studies
7, at pp . 23 ff.
Even law professors sometimes lack sensitivity on the issue of moral rights: see Goulet
v . Marchand (unreported, 1985, Que. S.C .), where a research assistant on a law text was
held entitled to be named as a co-author with the professors.
25 See, e.g., George Hensher Ltd v . Restawile Upholstery (Lanes) Ltd, [19751 R.P.C .
31 (H.L .), where the judges treat the reader with their views on what constitutes "art"-
and not surprisingly, not one is able to agree with any other of the five members on
the panel. Richard Posner makes the following point, relevant particularly to avant-garde
works: "Judges and administrators are for the most part middle-aged, upper-middle-class,
politically and socially conventional men and (increasingly) women. Ideas directed at the
young, the bohemian, the deviant, the extremist, and other marginal portions ofthe spectrum
of tastes and preferences are likely to leave these officials quite cold": Free Speech in
an Economic Perspective (1986), 20 Suffolk U.L . Rev. 1, at p. 25 . Posner has nonetheless
since entered the lists of literary criticism: see his Law and Literature (1988).
26 DRG Inc. v. Datafile Ltd (1987), 17 C.I.P.R. 136, at p. 145 (Fed. T.D .) .
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as an artistic work.27 As for literature, once short business letters written
in commercialese and internal office memoranda qualify as original literary
works,28 the deconstruction is complete and the gates are flung open to
admit anything into the fold. Business directories, business forms, contracts
drawnby lawyers, answers to puzzles, any collocation ofsymbols meaningful
to someone, are all called original literary works. In the United States,
there can apparently be a copyright in page numbers;29 and a British court
once said that even a single word may have copyright, although the court
eventually drew the line to exclude "Exxon": to the oil company whose
trademark it was, the word was no doubt a thing of beauty and a joy
forever, but it did not inform, please or instruct the judges hearing the
case and was not to them, therefore, a literary work.30 Against this
background, is it surprising that legislatures all over the world felt unable
to resist the ultimate reductionist logic, pressed on them by the computer
industry, to classify and protect computer programs in their electronic state
as literary works: invisible, unreadable, utilitarian-but literary nonetheless?
With music, the position in Canada is even odder. The requirements
in the 1921 Act31 that a musical work must have melody or harmony
and must be graphically notated exclude improvisations and much avant
garde music, including computer-generated or synthesized works. The
ultimate insult comes when the Act classifies music that is recorded only
z7 British Northrop Ltd v. Texteam Blackburn Ltd, [1974] R.P.C. 57, at p. 68 (Ch.
D.), Megarry J. Whitford J. also so concluded independently in Lerose Ltd v. Hawick
Jersey Int! Ltd, [1974] R.P.C . 42, at p. 47 (Ch. D.) : drawings are nothing more than
"lines drawn on paper". Cf., Merchandising Corp. ofAmerica Inc. v. Harpbond Ltd, [1983]
F.S .R . 42, at p. 47 (C.A .), holding that facial makeup did not constitute a "painting" :
"Two straight lines drawn with grease-paint with another line in between drawn with
some other colouring matter, in myjudgment, by itself could not possibly attract copyright"
What of minimalist art now'?
2SBridsh Oxygen Co. Ltd v. Liquid Air Ltd, [1925] 1 Ch . 383 (Ch. D.) (letter);
Beloff v. Pressdram Ltd, [1973] 1 All E.R. 241 (Ch. D.) (memorandum) ; Bourassa v.
Ouellet, (unreported, Que. S.C ., 1968, Dorion C.J .) (personal correspondence protected) .
29 West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central Inc., 799 F. 2d 1219 (C.A . 8, 1986).
We do not know for certain because the case, which involved the Lexis legal database
making West Publishing's case reports available for retrieval in competition with West's
Westlaw database, was settled by the parties before a judgment on the merits. Lexis now
pays West a royalty to use West's reports and statute compilations. The case is criticized
in L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright
Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations (1989), 36 U.C.L.A . L. Rev. 719.
30 Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Insurance Consultants Intl Ltd, [1981] 1 W.L.R . 624, at
pp. 634-635 (Ch. D.), affd, [1982] R.P .C . 69 (C.A .) . The oil company failed in its copyright
suit but succeeded in preventing the defendant from using Exxon in its name through
the law of passing off. See, generally, R. Wellek, What is Literature? and E.D . Hirsch
Jr ., What Isn't Literature, in P. Hernadi (ed.), What is Literature? (1978), pp . 16 ff. and
24 ff., respectively.
31 Copyright Act, supra, footnote 23, s. 2 (definition of "musical work") . See also
Janet Mosher, Twentieth Century Music: The Impoverishment in Copyright Law of a
Strategy of Forms (1989), 5 I.P.J . 51 .
1990]
	
Intellectual Property Today. OfMyths and Paradoxes 109
on tape, without graphic notation, as a sound recording-an industrial
work, which carries a shorter period of protection and no performing right,
and one whose copyright ownership rests in the owner of the physical
tape, who may not always be the composer .32
What has happened is plain enough . Copyright has little to do any
ore with arts and literature, and certainly not with the cutting edge of
music. These are simply the front line troops at the head of an army
of standardized industrial products-fungible pop records, soap operas,
formula films, pulp books on the racks of airport book stores, and the
detritus of commercial file notes and correspondence . 33 This phenomenon
also owes something to the influence and culture of the modern mass
media:
The communications industries have become vast and largely autonomous enterprises,
often imposing their own criteria upon the material they disseminate-criteria that
may be unrelated either to the impulses of the creator or to the needs of the audience .
The medium here tends to become the instrument of neither . Rather it may exist
to serve its own ends, the principal one of which may be to return profits to an
entrepreneur, primarily by attracting an appropriate audience . The medium thus may
cease to be a mechanism existing in order to link a creator to an audience; rather
the writer or composer may be hired to produce something to the medium's
specifications that will aid it in assembling and "conditioning" an audience for an
advertisement .34
I have no wish to denigrate this material, which fills much of our
leisure and working time and which we often value enough to be willing
to pay for it. l simply say that copyright accepts all corners into its fold .
Art and literature occupy so small a field that it is hard to see how copyright
law significantly encourages their creation .35
C. Does Copyright Law Encourage Dissemination of Works?
The third myth is that copyright law encourages works to be
disseminated. This is largely true if the copyright owner wishes the work
32Ibid., ss. 5(3), 5(4), 11 . See Bouliane c. ,service de la musique Bonanza Inc. (1986),
18 C.I .P.R. 214 (Que. C.A .) .
33 Cf., Alvin B. Kernan, Art and Law, Princeton Alumni Weekly (Oct. 12, 1988),
34, at p. 9: "The appearance in the eighteenth century of copyright laws and the linked
ideas of artistic creativity and originality was, as Marxist historians have pointed out, a
conversion of ideas into things. The sociological and economic conception of art as property
in a producer-consumer society was later reinforced by giving it a psychological base in
the creative genius of the individual and a moral base in the notion of plagiarism as a
specially abhorrent kind of theft." I am indebted to my colleague Simon Fodden for this
reference.
3413an Lacy, The Economics of Publishing, or Adam Smith and Literature (1963),
92 Daedalus 42, at p. 43.
3s Arguably, the patent system itself has encouraged this trend by diverting greater
proportions of society's energy towards the more tangible benefitsthat scienceandmaterialism,
which the patent system glorifies, hold out: Cf., Kenneth Clark, Art and Society, in M.C .
Albrecht, J.H. Barnett and M. Griff (eds .), The Sociology of Art and Literature (1970),
p. 635, esp. p. 642 ff.
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to be commercialized or publicized.36 If he or she does not, then copyright
law with its side-kick, the common law relating to the protection of
confidential information, turns into a blunt weapon of censorship. The
history of copyright has always been intertwined with that of censorship .
What is surprising is how strongly that strand persists to the present day.
Examples abound from all over the world.
In Canada, the federal government persuaded an appellate court to
enjoin the publication of a commercial abridgment of a multi-volume
published official report on the state of competition in the oil industry.
The Crown admitted that it would suffer little economic injury from the
abridgment, but the publisher should have asked for permission to publish,
which might or might not have been granted. It did not matter that, by
the time the wheels of bureaucracy ground their course, the publication
would probably have been stale . To cap matters, the publisher had to
hand over its stock of infringing books and its profits on sales, and only
narrowly missed being stung with an award of punitive damages for having
acted so high-handedly! Arguments about the public interest and freedom
of expression under the much-lauded Charter of Rights and Freedom were
brushed aside.37
In Australia, federal government documents were published in a book
demonstrating the muddle into which the government's foreign policy
towards the insurgencies in East Timor had fallen . The Australian gov
ernment asked the High Court to enjoin further publication because the
Crown's literary copyright was being infringed. The present Chief Justice
of Australia admitted that the public interest favoured publication of the
book but allowed the Crown's claim. The Crown was entitled to protect
its literary creativity from being admired by the world.38
And in the United Kingdom, there was the saga of former British
secret agent Peter Wright and his book Spycatcher, in which the British
36 But even this "truth" has its mythology. Thus, although copyright is often said
to encourage the dissemination of ideas because only the form and expression of the work,
not its underlying ideas, are protected (Cuisenaire v. South West Imports, [1969] S.C.R .
208, at pp. 211-212), an appellate court recently interpreted and followed British authority
to hold that copyright law can protect the form and "the information" in or "substantive
content" of a work: British Columbia Jockey Club v. Standen (1985), 22 D.L.R. (4th)
467 (B.C .C.A.) . This obviously may give copyright owners considerable power to control
who may disseminate their work and on what terms.
37R . v. James Lorimer & Co. Ltd (1984), 77 C.P.R. (2d) 262 (Fed . C.A .) . The
Canadian government has now issued guidelines for obtaining copyright permission. A
royalty of ten per cent of net sales revenue is levied, where a work comprises twenty
five per cent or more of government material. Permission may be denied on a number
of grounds, including where a department considers the use to be "inappropriate . . . for
legal or other specifable reasons" . See Treasury Board of Canada Circular No. 1986-
25, dated June 11, 1986, entitled Crown Copyright.
38 Commonwealth v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1981), 55 A.L .J.R. 45 (Aunt. H.C.).
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government persecuted Wright through litigation in Britain, Eire, Australia,
Hong Kong and New Zealand: "rapidly becoming the most litigated book
of all time", said the New Zealand Chief Justice even before half of the
worldwide proceedings against Wright had concluded39 Note that the
litigation, based primarily on Wright's breach of confidence to the British
government, had nothing to do with whether or not Wright was telling
the truth in claiming that 1 .1.5 had planned to destabilize the Wilson
government and assassinate President Nasser of Egypt, and that there was
yet another mole in 1 .1 .5 besides Philby, Burgess and company. (Indeed,
the British government indicated in the New Zealand courts that it would
not contest the truth of Wright's allegations, "primarily for reasons relating
to security", so it said.4°) The tables were turned on Wright: he himself
was called a traitor for talking about possible traitors in British intelligence!
The British judges finally threw in the towel after Spycatcher was published
throughout the world, outside the reach of their injunctions. But they
produced much purple prose in denouncing Wright and claiming that,
while many things might be of public interest, it was not necessarily in
the public interest that the public know them. In an attempt to make
Wright's life thoroughly miserable, they gratuitously added that Wright
and his publisher would not be allowed to assert any copyright in Spycatcher
in Britain and that, indeed, the Crown might even be the true copyright
owner of Spycatcher-though why Her Majesty might want to soil her
hands with a work that was, ex hypothesi, so treacherous is not explored.4 1
The British government's attempt to suppress Spycatcher had its private
censorship counterpart across the Atlantic in a United States case involving
the author of The Catcher in the Rye. Ian Hamilton used letters written
by J.D . Salinger that he found in a state archive for a biography on Salinger
that he was writing. Salinger sued Hamilton to make him drop the letters
from the book. Salinger succeeded . The recipient of the letters owned the
39A_G(UK) v. Wellington Newspapers Ltd, [198811 N.Z.L.R. 129, at p. 133 (H.C .),
Davison C.J ., refusing an injunction ; affd, ibid., 161 (C.A.), leave to appeal to the Privy
Council denied (ibid, 180, at p. 183) by the Court of Appeal, so as to prevent the Privy
Council being placed in the "individious position" of determining what the public interest
of New Zealand required .
40Ibid., at p. 170 (C.A.), agreement signed by counsel acting forthe British government
and produced to the court.
41A.G. v. Guardian NewspapersLtd(No. 2),[198812 W.L.R. 776 (H.L.). See, generally,
Yvonne Cripps, The Legal Implications of Disclosure in the Public Interest (1986) .
After the decision was handed down, an unmuzzled Guardian stated the conundrum
it saw arising from the Peter Wright litigation: "Either the man-grudges or not-is telling
the truth, or an approximation to it. In which case, the business of preventing publication
is the merest flim-flam of a sideshow, and the main duty of an elected government is
investigation, prosecution and swilling out secret stables. Or the poor old boy is and was
off his rocker. In which case, the real point is finding how someone as deranged and,
basically, fascist as Peter Wright was allowed for so many years to bug and brief and
vet at the heart of British intelligence ." Comment, At the end, the judges find the real
world, Guardian, October 14, 1988, p. 22.
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property in the paper,42 but Salinger owned the literary copyright. Hamilton
could use the ideas contained in the letters but could not reproduce their
expression .43 Note that Salinger did not write the letters because he thought
he could make money from them . He would have written them whether
or not the copyright laws existed. He enlisted copyright law to assist him
in maintaining his self-imposed seclusion and to dissuade meaningful
biographies being written about him. In the end, of course, Salinger failed
in his principal object. Hamilton's book was published, but it now lacked
the authenticity that Salinger's actual expression would have thrown on
its subject. But the threat of such proceedings now hangs over the head
of every biographer unauthorized by a recalcitrant subject or the subject's
heirs and affects the way in which such works are written.
A private censorship story even more dramatic than Salinger's occurred
in Canada in the early 1900s. The publishers Morang & Co. commissioned
the distinguished historian, William D. Le Sueur, to write a history of
William Lyon Mackenzie for the Makers of Canada series. Le Sueur got
access to Mackenzie's papers from the heirs, telling them he was writing
for the series . Both publisher and heirs expected the sort of hagiography
that passed for much historical and biographical writing in the nineteenth
century and which is still churned out to flatter the egos of the subject
and his or her progeny. But on Le Sueur's interpretation, Mackenzie was
not a maker of Canada: Canada was made despite, rather than because
of, Mackenzie's efforts . When Le Sueur turned in his manuscript, his
publisher was appalled and so were Mackenzie's heirs, to whom the publisher
42 The owner of property in the piece of paper may of course choose to destroy
the paper. Consider the controversy stirred by James Joyce's grandson,who recently destroyed
some of his aunt's correspondence and has refused permission to biographers to quote
from other family correspondence of which he is the copyright owner by descent: Caryn
James, Joyce Family Letters in Literary Debate, N.Y . Times, Aug. 15, 1988, pp . 13,
16 . For a professional academic historian's view on this subject, see Douglas Hay, Archival
Research in the History of the Law: A User's Perspective (1987), 24 Archivaria 36, esp.
p. 44 ff., on the differing points of view of historians and lawyers to the accessibility
of potentially embarrassing documentary information.
43 Salinger v. Random House Inc., 811 F. 2d 90 (C.A . 2, 1987); cf. Pierre Leval,
Fair Use or Foul? (1989), 36 Jo. Cop. Soc. U.S.A. 167, where the trial judge in Salinger,
whose decision was reversed, gives a spirited justification of his original decision ("It has
been exhilarating to find myself present at the cutting edge of the law, even though in
the role of the salami": ibid., p. 168).
Hamilton rewrote the book, which appeared in 1988 as In Search of J.D. Salinger.
When asked how he felt about writing other biographies, Hamilton reportedly said:
"Extremely reluctant. The subject would have to be very, very dead": Time, May 23,
1988, p. 69 . But this would not help him in countries where protection in unpublished
works is perpetual, such as Canada : Copyright Act, supra, footnote 23, s. 7. True, a Canadian
historian, who used letters from a state archive in his book, managed to escape a claim
of copyright infringement brought by the writer's descendants, but only because the court
held that the person who had donated the correspondence to the archive held (unusually)
both the copyright and the property rights in the correspondence and had intended to
transfer both rights absolutely to the archives : Bourassa v. Ouellet, supra, footnote 28 .
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showed the work . They pressured Morang not to publish. Not only did
Morang not publish but, in those pre-photocopier days, it refused to return
Le Sueur's sole copy of his manuscript . Le Sueur had to sue for its return
and won only by the skin of his teeth (a 3-2 decision) before the Supreme
Court of Canada .44 Put this was not the end of Le Sueur's troubles. When
he decided to publish the manuscript elsewhere, Mackenzie's heirs sued
to prevent his doing so. They said that they would never have given access
to the papers if they had known that Le Sueur would do a hatchet job
on the name of their illustrious forebear. 1,e Sueur had got access only
on the basis that he would depict Mackenzie as a maker of Canada, not
a "puller down"; he had broken this implied agreement or "confidence"
by writing as he did. The Ontario courts agreed with the heirs : Le Sueur
was enjoined from publishing . He might own the product of his brain
but he could not reveal it45 Le Sueur did not live to see his biography
of Mackenzie published . Only in 1979, seventy years after Le Sueur wrote,
was the work published, presumably because it could now do no harm .
Other historians had in the meantime published similar conclusions relying
on different material.
1n all these cases, the defendant claimed some variant of the defence
that it was dealing fairly with the plaintiff's work or otherwise acting in
the public interest . In all the cases, the defence failed . Copyright and theories
of confidential information here run counter to democratic ideals and tend
to enclose rather than disseminate knowledge. Of course, as the Meter Wright
and the J.O . Salinger cases show, these laws are.not always fully effective,
given the greater ease with which technology now allows communications
to occur and spread; but Peter Wright's case also demonstrates that the
laws of copyright and confidential information, especially in the hands
ofadeterminedgovernmentwith almost infinite legaland financial resources,
can be potent weapons of harassment against all but the strongest-willed
and deep-pocketed defendant.
4 1Vforang & Co. v. Le Sueur (1911), 45 S.C.R . 95 .
au Lindsey v. Le Sueur (1913), 29 O.L.R. 648 (App . Div.), Wing (1913), 27 O.L.R.
588 (H.C .) . The saga is retold by Cameron Harvey and Linda Vincent, Mackenzie and
LeSueur: Historians' Rights (1980), 10 Manitoba L.J. 281.
Harvey and Vincent claim that the Ontario courts' decision was "probably not
sustainable" at law (ibid., at p. 288). Even if they are right, one wonders whether, if
a similar high-profile case were to occur today, a court would reach a different result.
In the 1968 case of Bourassa v. Ouellet, supra, footnote 28, although finding against the
plaintiffs on the copyrightinfringement issue, a Quebec courtheld that the defendanthistorian
had defamed the plaintiffs' family name by suggesting that their forebears' correspondence
revealed signs of mental instability . It granted damages for the defamation, causing the
publishers to withdraw the book from circulation .
Perhaps it is as true now, as it was in Le Sueur's day, that a society has difficulty
in tolerating certain views to become current about its history, and that courts may prefer
orthodoxy over heterodoxy in this sphere as much as they do in others .
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW
II . Patents
[Vol. 69
So far, I have spoken mainly about the copyright system . What of patents?
The theory of the patent law is that if I invent something-a new
machine, drug, process or method of doing something, or an improvement
to an existing machine-I can apply to the Patent Office for a patent
on my invention. If my discovery is something new, useful andinventive-
that is, not something that any skilled worker could have done without
much difficulty-then I will get a patent for a period that varies from
country to country (in Canada, previously seventeen years from date of
grant, now as from October 1, 1989, twenty years from date of application) .
The patent allows me to stop anyone else making, using, importing or
selling my invention, whether they copied my invention or created it
independently without ever having heard of or seen my work. Unfortunately
for inventors, however, patents apply only in the country of grant: if I
want protection elsewhere, I have to apply for patents country by country-
and quickly, for the first sale or publication of the invention in any country
will often bar the availability of a patent in others .46 Patenting is expensive,
as I will need the help of a patent agent or patent attorney to process
the application-and these professionals do not come cheaply.47
A. Are Patents a Good Thing?
It depends to whom you speak. Members of the patent bar andjudges
who try patent cases (who, in their previous incarnation as lawyers, often
litigated them) generally unite in lauding the virtues of the system . One
hardly expects them to do otherwise . They may have families to support
46 A mistake can be costly. The Hayes telecommunication standard for computer
modems was patented in North America but, because Hayes failed to file in Europe within
a year of the North American filing, its European patents lack this claim and Hayes can
recover no royalties from European modem manufacturers who use its system : Barry Fox,
Patents in the pending tray, Guardian, Feb. 9, 1989. Canada's accession in 1989 to the
Patent Cooperation Treaty will reduce the paperwork and cost involved in filing fresh
applications in many countries: one application will serve equally as an application in
such other countries as the applicant nominates.
47 The cost of patenting and litigating has provided grist to the novelist's mill at least
since Charles Dickens' Poor Man's Tale of a Patent (1850), (conveniently reproduced
in Jeremy Phillips, Charles Dickens and `Poor Man's Tale of a Patent' (1984)). See, too,
JohnSteinbeck's 1954 letter to a friend : "My grandfatherSamHamilton was always inventing
things and patenting them. Mother claimed he kept the family broke with fees to patent
lawyers. When he got a good one it was stolen so fast it whistled . And then he kept
us broke with an infringement suit which he lost through running out of money."; Elaine
Steinbeck and Robert Wallsten (eds .), Steinbeck: A Life in Letters (1981), p. 493.
This notwithstanding, a nationwide shortage of patent attorneys was recently reported
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or may have grown to accept the system uncritically from working so
long and so closely with it.48
ut theirs is only one view of the world. The disadvantages of patents
have often been revealed by those professing the dismal science. True,
in the heyday of industrialization, theorists such as Adam Smith andJeremy
entham claimed that patents were necessary to encourage invention at
no social cost, but later commentators have been more sceptical. Calling
the patent system a "huge mistake", F.W. Taussig (and later A.C. Pigou)
thought that patents neither gave very much to nor took very much from
the public. Arnold Plant went further to claim that patents were positively
detrimental, except, unusually, where research was so costly that no short-
run market reward was likely. More recently, Kenneth Arrow has claimed
that patents are indeed useful, but direct government investment in invention
achieves better results.49 The views of some modern economists who
vigorously support retention of the patent system are particularly revealing.
Candidly admitting that the system has, in their words, weaknesses and
absurdities and is illogical, wasteful, crude and inconsistent, they conclude :
It is almost impossible to conceive of any existing social institution so faulty in
so many ways. It survives only because there seems to be nothing better.5o
Edith Penrose reached a similar, more moderately phrased, conclusion in
the 1950s:51
If national patent laws did not exist, it would be difficult to make a conclusive
case for introducing them; but the fact that they do exist shifts the burden of proof
48 Although some patent lawyers do criticize the system, especially when speaking
to one another (see, e.g., the collection of papers in AIPPI, Venetian Patent Law (1974)),
their general tendency uncritically to favour extending patentability wherever possible has
been noted. Thus, examining the amici curiae briefs in computer software patentability
cases and noting that the question might "apparently" be affected by "institutional bias",
Stevens J. (dissenting with three other justices) said, only thinly veiling his reproach : "In
each of those cases, the spokesmen for the organized patent bar have uniformly favored
patentability and industry representatives have taken positions properly motivated by self-
interest" : Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 173, at p. 217 (1981) .
49 The views of Bentham, Taussig, Pigou, Plant and Arrow are succinctly discussed
by Steven Cheung, Property Rights and Invention (1986), 8 Research in Law & Economics
5, passim.
50 John Jewkes, David Sawers and Richard Stillerman, The Sources of Invention
(2nd ed ., 1969), pp. 187-188. After this damning indictment, the authors justify the system's
retention by claiming that it is the only practicable way to reward the "individual inventor
or the small producer struggling to market an idea" : ibid., at p. 188. The Economic Council
of Canada partly relied on this evidence to support retention of the patent system, while
noting that the number of Canadian patents granted to independent inventors, as compared
with corporations, fell from 97.3% in 1908 to 36.5% in 1968, and that only 5% of all
Canadian patents granted went to Canadians: Report on Industrial and Intellectual Property
(1971), ch. 4. Statistics in other industrialized countries are little different : over 80% of
all U.S. patents are granted for employee inventions, as are 90% of all useful patents in
France and Germany: see, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavaua, 8 U.S .P.t2. (2d) 1537, at p. 1542
(N.J. Sup. Ct., 1988).
51 Edith Penrose, The Economics of the International Patent System (1951), p. 40 .
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and it is equally difficult to make a really conclusive case for abolishing them. Few
deny, however, that there are very serious defects in the system today and minor
reforms of the patent law are fairly frequent in most countries. Attempts at reform,
particularly if they tend to reduce the scope of the monopoly, are violently attacked
and usually misrepresented by vested interests, but it should be clear by now that
even if a reduction in the patent monopoly is recommended such a recommendation
can hardly be regarded as an attack on "the rights of man in their very essence".
These admissions of the system's faults have prompted others to look
for something better. Thus, Michael Goldhaber has claimed that :S2
Instead of encouraging beneficial innovation, . . . the effect of the intellectual property
laws may be more to aid in the concentration of wealth and raise profits. The
firms that benefit can then use their increased power to further prevent competition
from outside innovators and thus increase their control over the direction ofinnovation
as a whole. State power ought not to be used in this manner-to strengthen the
already strong . Rather, it should help to promote greater equality. In conferring
wealth on innovators, it is well to remember also that their achievements, no matter
how great, rest on a basis ofprior inventions and discoveries ofsociety as a whole-
many of which have already been paid for directly by the federal government.
[A] democratic innovation policy . . . should promote socially beneficial innovation
as fast as society can in fact benefit. The innovation process should be as open
and democratic as possible, recognizing that innovation is ultimately a process of
change in which everyone in society participates in one way or another. There should
be quick response to negative impacts. The policy should not promote inequality
through concentrating wealth, nor should it encourage repressive measures .
Goldhaber goes on to propose that the patent and copyright systems,
insofar as they deal with technological innovations, be replaced by an
Intellectual Claims Act, supervised by a Commission that would grant
intellectual property claims with an eye to furthering the policies Goldhaber
states above. Proposals such as these, which would require the radical
reconsideration ofboth national and international intellectual property laws,
represent a healthy countertrend to the modern movement simply to expand
and intensify protection. Although creators' groups have sometimes appeared
at the forefront of this movement, more often the pressure has come from
52 Michael Goldhaber, Reinventing Technology (1986), ch. 10. Views such as these
have received official recognition. In the context of copyright, see, e.g., U.S . Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics
and Information, OTA-CIT-302 (Washington, D.C., 1986), p. 14: ". . . intellectual property
policy can no longer be separated from other policy concerns . Because information is,
in fact, central to most activities, decisions about intellectual property law may be decisions
about the distribution of wealth and social status. Furthermore, given the unlimited scope
of the new technologies and the growing trade in information-based products and services,
U.S . intellectual property policy is now inextricably tied to international affairs . Com-
munications policy, too, is becoming more linked to intellectual property policy, as more
and more intellectual works are being transmitted by media such as cable television, telephone
lines, and communications satellites . Today, intellectual property issues also give rise to
privacy concerns as copyright holders seek technical means to monitor use. In making
decisions about intellectual property policy, therefore, Congress must consider a whole
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groups with vested interests in the present system, who are able effectively
and strategically to mobilize creator groups in furtherance of their perceived
common interests .53
I shall not dwell on the paradox inherent in the fact that supporters
of inventive activity often react so vehemently when any move is proposed
to modify, inventively or otherwise, a system devised in the seventeenth
century. Nor shall I catalogue the many faults of the present patent system,
a task fully done by others .54 I shall simply deal mainly with one aspect
that suggests the degree of rethinking that may require to be done : the
concept of invention itself.55
. Patents do not Protect "Mere" Theories
if the logic of the patent system's grant of incentives and rewards
to individuals is to be pursued, then there is a case for expanding the
definition of invention . Before the Industrial Revolution restructured labour
on divided lines, there was no clear-cut distinction between discovery and
invention, basic and applied research, and science andtechnology. Although
we are now rediscovering the artificiality of these divisions, the patent
system continues to reinforce them . Thus, everyone agrees that basic research
such as Albert Einstein's work on relativity is unpatentable . Patent law
does not protect mere discoveries of how the world works. But as soon
as someone applies the theory of relativity to acommercial use-"changes",
rather than just "discovers", nature-they can get a patent for the end
product or process employing the theory. We say, on the one hand, that
the giant's reward should be the satisfaction of discovery and fame ; we
say, on the other, that the mechanical pygmy is an inventor and reward
him or her with a patent . There is a value system inherent in this: the
only results for which society is prepared to pay are practical results; theory's
rewards are intangible. The pygmy who uses the giant's theory should
not have to pay the giant for it.56
53 And once in place, patent and copyright systems have enormous staying power.
One commentator has astutely observed : "Copyright and patent acts are so mind-bogglingly
complicated that they usually last at least a generation because few legislators can bear
the experience twice": Ehrlichman, Lobbyists with designs on the complex art of copyright,
Guardian, July 26, 1988 .
54 E.g., Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman, op. cit., footnote 50 .
55Some of these thoughts echo those of F.K. Beier, Future Problems of Patent Law
(1972), 3 IIC 423, which I came across after delivering the lecture and which (though
I did not consciously have it in mind at the time) I must have read some time ago.
This unwittingly reinforces a theme of this paper, that in intellectual property there is
hardly anything new under the sun.
56 In the literary sphere, P.G. wodehouse recognized a moral obligation to this effect
even before he had become famous . A friend suggested to vdodehouse the idea of the
main character in vdodehouse's Love Among the Chickens. Wodehouse acknowledged
the contribution in the dedication to the book and spontaneously sent him a third of
the royalty proceeds from the first edition: David Jasen, P.G . Wodehouse: A Portrait of
a Master (1981 rev. ed.), p. 37 .
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We might consider a reform such as the grant of a special sort of
patent to the theorist. This "theory patent" might allow other theorists
to build on the knowledge revealed, but might require entrepreneurs and
patentees applying the theory to pay the theory patentee a proportion of
their revenues, based on the extent to which the theory contributed to
their application.57
C. The Standard of Invention is too Low
In other respects, the standard of invention is set too low. Patent
lawyers advise that virtually any new gadget or way of doing things is
patentable: it is just a question of skilful drafting.s 8 There is, of course,
an element of drumming up business in such advice, but there is also
some truth. Many patents are known to be invalid, but to challenge them
by litigation is a business decision: are the costs of taking a licence on
a per unit royalty lower than the costs and uncertainties of litigating
invalidity?59 If so, better to be licensed than to fight.6° And there are also
57 Contrary to the Canadian position (see Schlumberger v. Comm . ofPatents (1981),
56 C.P.R. (2d) 204 (Fed. C.A.)), the U.S . Patent Office is now granting patents for algorithms,
even where they constitute most of the claim, so long as a general application is stated .
Some fear that, as a result, "mathematics will become poorer as mathematicians become
richer": Edmund Andrews, Equations Patented: Some See a Danger, N.Y. Times, Feb.
15, 1989, pp . 25, 30. Whether these patents will eventually survivejudicial scrutiny remains
to be seen: cf., In Re Grams, 12 U.S .P.Q . (2d) 1824 (C.A ., Fed. Circ., 1989), denying
a patent for an algorithm for analyzing clinical data .
My suggestion seeks to reward the theoretician without inhibiting further theoretical
research . It resembles a proposal internationally debated for some decades after World
War I, but finally dropped under industry pressure: see J. Swanson, Scientific Discoveries
and Soviet Law (1984), ch . 2; cf., Beier, loc. cit., footnote 55, at p. 438 ff.
58 Consider this advice from a patent lawyer : "The inventor is often the worst possible
person to assess whether or not an invention is patentable. By definition, the inventor
has exercised some ingenuity, but he may not however truly recognize or appreciate this
fact . To the inventor, therefore, the invention may seem completely old or obvious . . .
In many casesthe slightest difference between the invention and thepriorart will be sufficient
to obtain a patent, particularly in the hands ofa skilledpatent agent." Frank Farfan, What
Should the General Practitioner Know about Patents, Anyway?, in Intellectual Property
for the General Practitioner, Canadian Bar Association-Ontario, Continuing Legal
Education (November 19, 1988), pp. 3-4 (emphasis in original).
59 "The fear of a costly law suit is apt to deter any but wealthy competitors from
contesting a Patent" : Natural Colour Kinematograph Co. Ltd (in Liq.) v. Bioschemes Ltd
(1915), 32 R.P.C. 256, at p. 266 (H.L .), by Earl Loreburn. And, elaborating the modern
British experience, Barry Fox, loc. cit, footnote 46, says: "The sad truth is that playing
with patents is like playing poker. Goodness, moral rights and fair dealing have little to
do with the final result of a dispute . The player with the best hand has less chance of
losing, but no guarantee of winning. A moat of techno-legal terms surrounds naturaljustice .
It is crippingly expensive to cross. So patent negotiation is brinkmanship. No one wants
to push a case so far that it passes out of the hands of patent agents, who can charge
over £100 an hour for their time, into the hands of specialist lawyers who will charge
even more. If the case goes to court, a room full of bewigged counsel and expert witnesses
will clock up thousands of pounds a day in fees, like a berserk taxi-meter. A patent case
in the High Court can easily cost £100,000."
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free-rider problems in litigating invalidity : not only will the successful
challenger be free to make the product, but so too will its competitors,
who have not borne the costs of litigation. Thus, many invalid patents
exist, adding to the costs of goods and services, simply because it does
not pay anyone to challenge them.
There is no insuperable difficulty in raising the standard of invention
beyond the "mere scintilla" currently required, in order to eliminate a
great number of these mundane inventions and marginal patents. Whether
an applicant has demonstrated that he or she has produced an invention
or an unpatentable "workshop improvement" is already a highly subjective
decision, as many judges frankly admit.61 Yet modern courts unabashedly
demonstrate a pro-patent bias, even when faced with the simple
"invention".62
Consider the recent United States proceedings in Roberts v. Sears,
Roebuck & 00.63 A basement inventor produced a quick-release socket
wrench for which a patent was obtained. His suit for infringement was
initially defeated by a Court of Appeals' holding that the improvement
was obvious: "not the kind of contribution unlikely to be induced except
by the promise of a monopoly . . . we think it would have been made
anyway, and soon"64 So said Judge hosner for the unanimous three-person
60 In British Commonwealth countries, the decision to be licensed carries risks that
may not, after such cases as Lear Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S . 653 (1969), and Meehan
v. PPG Industries Inc., 802 F. 2d 881 (C.A. 7, 1986), be present in the U.S . : the
Commonwealth licensee is estopped from challenging the validity of the licence during
its pendency and, unless the contract or local legislation provides the contrary, will even
have to continue paying royalties if the patent is held invalid: African Gold Recovery
Co. Ltd v. Sheba Gold Mining Co. (1897), 14 R.P.C. 660; Trubenizing Process Corp.
v. John Forsyth Ltd, [1943] S.C.R . 422, at p. 432; Kerbing Consolidated Ltd v. Dick,
[1972] IW .Z.L.R. 911 (S.C.) ; CuLean Inventions Ltdv. Midwestern Broom Co . Ltd, [1984]
3 W.W.R . 11, at pp . 31-33 (Sack. QB.) .
61 "To the casual observer, judicial patent decisions are the adventures of judges' souls
among inventions . For a decision as to whether or not a thing is an invention is a `value'
judgment. So are many judicial judgments in other legal provinces, but `invention' is a
peculiarly elusive standard": Picard v. United Aircraft, 53 U.S.P.Q. 563, at pp . 568-569
(C.A. 2, 1942), by FrankJ. Collier J. approvingly cited this passage in Farbwerke Hoechst
AG v. Halocarbon (Ont) Ltd (1974), 15 C.P.R. (2d) 105, at p. 112 (Fed . T.D.), affd
(1979), 42 C.P.R . (2d) 145 (S.C.C.), rev'ing (1976), 28 C.P.R . (2d) 63 (Fed. C.A .) .
62 Recall Pigeon J.'s well-known dictum that "inventors are not to be looked upon
as Shylock claiming his pound of flesh" : Burton Parsons Chemicals Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard
(Can.) Ltd (1974), 17 C.P.R. (2d) 97, at p. 106 (S.C.C.). A commentator has noted that
Pigeon J.'s approach was "generous, understanding and liberal from the viewpoint of
patentees" : George Stewart, Mr. Justice Louis-Philippe Pigeon and Intellectual Property
(1987), 3 I.P.J. 229, at p. 241.
63 723 F. 2d 1324 (C.A . 7, 1983). This strenously contested litigation had come before
the Court of Appeals three times already: see, 573 F. 2d 876 (1978) ; 617 F. 2d 460
(1980) ; 697 F. 2d 796 (1983).
64 697 F.2d, at p. 798. On the rehearing, 723 F.2d, at pp . 1345-1346, Posner J.
(now dissenting) elaborates the point.
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panel, applying, as befits the doyen of the law and economics movement,
an economic test of obviousness. On reargument before a full bench of
the Seventh Circuit, however, Posner's view was reversed by a majority
of the court. The court was clearly amazed by what the interaction of
a ball, a groove and a spring can achieve in the physical world, and suspicious
ofapplying any sort of economic theory to test inventiveness . Is this statement
from the majority opinion not revealing: "It is obviously easier to use
the wrench than it is to understand what makes it easier to use"?65
One may sympathize with the court's bedazzlement with the marvels
of elementary mechanics, and with its desire to recognize the plight of
the lone basement inventor pitted against a corporation that appears to
have dealt sharply with him. But these intuitions are misplaced . It will
take more than decisions like these to remove the lone inventor off the
list of endangered species and, in the meantime, the court's low standard
of inventiveness enures to the benefit of corporate improvers . Admitting
that the concept of invention is already highly subjective, we need to go
at least as far as Posner's test, unless we stop paying lip-service to the
pretence that the patent system spurs creativity that would not exist without
it.
D. Patents Should Benefit Society
We maywant to go further and require that patents should be granted
only for inventions that the applicant can demonstrate will substantially
benefit society.
Granting a patent is not a neutral act. Not all inventions will necessarily
benefit society.66 This was recognized as far back as the first British patent
law in 1624: patents for inventions that were "mischievious to the State,
by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally
inconvenient" should not be granted.67 The language about "raising prices
of commodities at home" may have been legislative double-talk for, even
before the statute, people knew full well that patent monopolies inevitably
raised prices68 So, too, the prohibition against "generally inconvenient"
patents now appears as window-dressing, for few patents have been
successfully challenged on this ground . Yet this provision as a whole
65 723 F.2d, at p. 1336.
66 Heskett, Industrial Design (1980), p. 195, makes the same point in dealing with
industrial designs: "`good design', however defined in terms specific to an artefact or
mechanism, cannot automatically be associated with beneficial ethical or political ideals;
such juxtapositions are frequent but do not constitute an equation ."
67 Statute of Monopolies 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, s . 6.
68 The Case of Monopolies (DarCy v. Allein) (1602), 11 Co. Rep. 84b, at p. 86b
(Q.B .): "[t]here are three inseparable incidents to every monopoly againstthe commonwealth,
sc . 1 . That the price o£ the same commodity will be raised, for he who has the sole
selling of any commodity may and will make the price as he pleases . . ." .
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demonstrates that patents were granted for a social purpose, and this insight
is as true now as it was then .
Instead of requiring a defendant to disprove a patent's utility, we
could require the applicant initially to show what actual or potential social
value the invention has that would warrant a patent grant. We might
go further and recognize that, in practice, the patent system does not
encourage enough investment in applied research to preserve such fun-
damental necessities of the human condition as the environment and the
repairing of damage done to ît . 69 To overcome this problem, society could
modify the patent system, by allowing grants only for activities that are
deemed; from time to time, to be particularly beneficial to it and by denying
patents (or reducing their term or intensity) in all other areas.
P. Pioneeiing Patents
Patent applications at the frontiers of knowledge should be carefully
scrutinized . New multicellular life forms, for example, are now patentable
in the United States. The United States Supreme Court has endorsed the
view that "anything under the sunmade by man" (and we presume, woman)
is patentable .7° Acting on this opinion, the United States Patent Office
recently held that a new artificially bred and non-naturally occurring form
of Pacific oyster waspatentable subject-matter,7a andthe first United States
patent for a genetically engineered animal ("the Harvard mouse"), was
granted in 1985 .72
69 Even strong proponents of the patent system, like the general secretary of AIPPI
(l'Association Internationale pour la Protection de la Propriété Industrielle), have admitted
that the patentsystem is deficient in this respect: ItudolfBlum, The Threat to our Environment
and the Protection of Intellectual Property, in AIPPI, op. cit., footnote 48, p. 42, at p. 55
ff., esp. p. 60. Blum proposes some additional system to encourage investment in areas
the patent system does not encourage. He does not consider another possibility, namely,
that the patent system itself should be fine-tuned to achieve his goals, to "sufficiently induce
and produce all of the inventions urgently needed now and tomorrow" (ibid., p. 60).
See also Beier, loc. cit., footnote 55, at pp. 441-445.
70Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S . 303, at p. 309 (1980) .
71 Ex p. Allen (1987), 2 U.S.P.Q. (2d) 1245 (U.S. Board of Patent Appeals). See
the notice published by the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks in 1077 Official
Gazette 24 (April 21, 1987): "nonnaturally occurring non-human multicellular living
organisms, including animals" would thenceforth be considered patentable subject-matter.
This view is subject tojudicial review but hasnonetheless beenupheld as a validadministrative
guideline: Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg (1989), 9 U.S.P.Q . (2d) 1816 (D.C .,
N.D . Cal.) .
72 The patent was widely publicized as being simply for a new mouse. In fact, it
is much broader. U.S. Patent #4,736,866 of April 12, 1988, naming researchers Philip
Leder and TimothyA. Stewart as inventors, is headed "Transgenic Non-human Mammals" .
Claim 1 of 12 claims, in descending order of generality, is for a "transgenic non-human
mammal all of whose germ cells and somatic cells contain a recombinantactivated oncogene
sequence introduced into said mammal, or an ancestor of said mammal, at an embryonic
stage". The new animals are said to be useful, amongst other things, as testers for suspected
cancer-causing materials.
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Other countries have proceeded more cautiously. Thus, in Europe,
life forms more complex than micro-organisms, such as plant varieties and
animals, are unpatentable .73 In Canada, the Supreme Court, while not
reversing holdings of the Patent Office and the Federal Court of Appeal
that plants are unpatentable, has rendered it virtually impossible for
applications for such patents to comply adequately with the requirement
that the invention be fully disclosed so as to be reproducible by a third
party.74 The Canadian Patent Appeal Board, however, indicated its willing-
ness to accept applications for multicellular life forms, five years before
the United States Patent Office took this plunge with the Pacific oyster?$
We are not persuaded that the idea [that plants, animals, and insects created by
man are patentable] is so far-fetched or illogical. If an inventor creates a new and
unobvious insect which did not exist before (and thus is not a product of nature),
and can recreate it uniformly and at will, and it is useful (e.g., to destroy the spruce
bud worm), then it is every bit as much a new tool of man as a micro-organism.
With still higher life forms, it is of course less likely that the inventor will be able
to reproduce it at will and consistently, as more complex life forms tend to vary
more from individual to individual. But if it eventually becomes possible to achieve
such a result, and other requirements of patentability are met, we do not see why
it should be treated differently.
The morality, ethics and legal7b and economic implications of granting
At the time the patent was granted, there were apparently 14,000 biotechnology
applications pending, including 21 for other animals: Keith Schneider, Biotechnology
Advances Make Life Hard for Patent Office, N.Y Sunday Times, Apr. 17, 1988, p. E5.
73 European Patent Convention 1973, Art. 53 . As for micro-organisms, see Chartered
Institute of Patent Agents, C.I .P .A. Guide to the Patents Act 1977 (2nd ed., 1984), pp .
7-8 (patentable) ; Micro-Organisms, Case B52/84, [1986] 4 European Patent Office Reps .
204 (Austrian Pat. Off., App. Div.) (unpatentable) . Note too that in Genentech Inc.'s
Patent, [1989] R.P.C. 147 (C.A.), a British patent for a DNA genetic engineering advance
for artificially producing cells found in nature was revoked as pertaining to mere "discovery"
rather than "invention" .
74 Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd v. Comm of Patents (1987), 11 C.I .P .R . 165 (Fed. C.A.),
holding an artificially cross-bred soybean variety unpatentable subject-matter, affd on other
grounds (1989), 60 D.L.R . (4th) 223 (S.C.C.) .
Many countries have a separate system to protect new plant varieties : e.g., the Plant
Varieties and Seed Act 1964 (U.K.), c. 14 . Legislation granting rights to plant breeders
may also be coming to Canada : see Consumer & Corporate Affairs Canada, Bureau of
Policy Coordination, Patenting Life Forms&Processes (August 1986), CCAC Paper No . 192
25005 E 86-08. Indeed, a Plant Breeders' Rights Bill, versions of which were given first
reading in the Canadian House of Commons in 1980 and 1988, was reintroduced as
Bill C-15 on May 8, 1989.
75Re Abitibi Co. (1982), 62 C.P.R. (2d) 80, at p. 90 (Pat . App. Bd.).
76 Biotechnology patents have generated problems such as whether the owner of the
living material used to develop the invention has any proprietary interest in the patent .
Thus, a patient, whose spleen was removed and its cells used, without his informed consent,
by researchers to develop a patented therapeutic cell-line, has asserted a property right
in his cells and a claim to share in the proceeds of their exploitation: Moore v. Regents
of the University of California, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (C.A ., 2nd Dis., 1988), holding, over
one dissent, for the patient . The case is currently before the Supreme Court of California :
Stephen Labaton, Spleen Suit Vexes Biotech Industry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1989, p. 22.
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patents to new life forms have not yet been fully debated. Everyone agrees
that the Patent Office is not the place to do this ; but it should be done
somewhere. Is there not a need for an initial and ongoing scrutiny of
such applications and patents? If they do prove "mischievous to the State",
should not the state be able to intervene and revoke them?77
E. Publicly Disclosing the Invention
The requirement that the invention be fully disclosed is said to lie
"at the heart of the whole patent system";78 yet it is a heart that beats
but faintly. Despite many attempts to curb a practice stretching back as
far as the eighteenth century, 79 the United States Supreme Court more
recently noted the continuing presence of a "highly developed art of drafting
patent claims so that they disclose as little useful information as possible-
while broadening the scope of the claim as widely as possible" .8o Moreover,
the invention need be understood only by those skilled in the relevant
technology. Intelligent members of the public are disenfranchised: they have
no idea of how a new invention may affect them because the language
of the patent is not and need not be addressed to them. A judge who
once suggested that a patent should be intelligible to the ordinary person
was firmly rebuffed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Canada:81
77 Barry Hoffmaster, The Ethics of Patenting Higher Life Forms (1988), 4 I.P .J. 1,
after reviewing the moral issues, at pp . 23-24, states that the objections to genetic engineering
are "not, at present, compelling", but concludes : "The factors to which these objections
point require constant scrutiny, however, and changes in them would warrant a careful
reappraisal of genetic engineering's status . What genetic engineering requires, above all,
is constant vigilance." Cf. Beier, loc. cit., footnote 55, at pp . 428-431.
78 Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Sask.) Ltd, [1981] 1 S.C.R . 504, at p. 538,
(1981), 122 D.L.R . (3d) 203, at p. 212. The court in Pioneer Hi-Bred, supra, footnote
74, applied this principle recently to disallow an application for an artificially cross-bred
plant.
79 Thus, Richard Arkwright deliberately failed to specify how to construct his patented
cotton gins, purportedly "in prevention of an evil, that foreigners [i.e., the French] might
not get them": R. v. Arkwright (1785), 1 Webster's Patent Cases 64, at p. 68 (K.B .) .
Buller J. inferred that Arkwrighfs "object was to get the benefit from the patent so far
as putting money in his own pocket, but as to the benefit the public were to receive,
it was to be kept back as far as it could" : ibid., at p. 67 . The patent was revoked on
a writ of scire facias .
so Brennerv. Manson, supra, footnote 5, at p. 534. As one manifestation of this practice,
consider what Fox, loc. cit., footnote 46, says about an IBM British 1964-fled patent:
"This covers work by Dr . Gene Amdahl and it fills three whole bound volumes on the
shelves of the library vaults, equivalent to 300 normal applications . It would take clone
makers from now until the next century to analyse IBM's patent folio in the hope of
contesting it in court . It will usually be quicker, easier and cheaper to pay a royalty and
put up the price of the product so that the customer pays for IBM's poker."
To deter such practices, there shouldbe some effective means ofcontrolling the amount
of information a patent can reveal. Too much information can be as bad as too little .
si Consolboard Inc. v . MacMillan Bloedel (Sack.) Ltd, supra, footnote 78, at pp. 523,
526 (S.C.R.), 215, 218-219 (D.L.R .) . Nor does full disclosure require the disclosure of
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[A] patent specification is addressed, not to the public generally, but to persons
skilled in the particular art. . . . [The inventor is not bound to disclose] in what
respect the invention is new or in what way it is useful. He must say what it is
he claimed to have invented. He is not obliged to extol the effect or advantage
of his discovery, if he describes his invention so as to produce it.
If patents are to form a pool of publicly available knowledge, then
they should be accessible generally, not just to the relevant industry. The
applicant, who seeks the privilege, should bear the cost of providing this
information. The Plain Language movement has gathered pace in relation
to contracts and other legal documents . Why should patents be immune?82
G. Patents as Third WorldAid?
Should there be any obligation on the industrialized developed countries
to spread their technologies to less developed countries? This is done only
randomly at present. There is a case for treating patents as a form of
Third World aid and for recognizing a moral obligation to help countries
less fortunate than our own by allowing them to work patents locally
(but not for export) either for free or at a reduced royalty. A compulsory
translation right for developing countries already exists under international
copyright law;83 an analogous principle could easily be applied to patents.84
the know-how necessary to render the invention commercially effective, with the result
that "many inventionscannot be worked with commercial effectivenesswithoutthe associated
know-how held by the patentee and not disclosed in the patent" : Denis Magnusson, Scientific
Research and New Technology as seen from the Perspective of International Intellectual
Property Developments (1986), Queen's Law Journal (International Perspectives) 393, at
p. 396.
Beier, loc. cit., footnote 55, p. 445 ff., claims that the function of disclosure has changed
today: most inventions are so complex that the patent cannot disclose practically how
to work them and any compulsory licensing system (as exists in Canada) to correct patent
abuse is seriously defective unless it compels disclosure of associated know-how (ibid,
p. 449) . More basically, if Beier is right, then the consideration which the patentee is
supposed to be giving the public in return for the monopoly has now partially failed.
Ordinarily, of course, on unjust enrichment theory, a partial failure of consideration invites
a diminution ofcorresponding benefits-but nobody (including Beier) has hithertho suggested
this!
82 Consider the "anguished comment" and "perplexed cry" uttered by a Federal Court
judge about drafting patent claims : "Claim 1 (to use an example) of this patent has
approximately 178 words. The Gettysburg address has, I understand, 270 words. But the
Gettysburg masterpiece uses not only words but punctuation, including periods, to convey
its meaning. Claim 1 has no periods . It is one long complicated sentence employing
approximately 6 commas . It is said that the Patent Rules . . . and the Patent Office require
that claims be stated in this way-one sentence. I suspect the real answer is that this
drafting method is merely traditional. We lawyers are slaves to tradition . . . In patent
suits, claims are often, at best, riddles . When technical words and phrases are all bundled
into one huge sentence, the claim passes from riddle to enigma": Collier J. in Xerox of
Can. Ltd v. IBMCan. Ltd (1977), 33 C.P.R. (2d) 24, at p. 88, n. 14 (Fed. T.D.).
83 See, e.g., Appendix to the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works, Paris
Act 1971, Sam Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of literary and artistic
works: 1886-1986 (1987), pp . 623 ff.
84A compulsory licensing scheme for developing countries, involving the payment
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111. Revisiting Intellectual "Property"
I wish to conclude by returning to the notion of "property" that underlies
this area . I can do no better than to cite a passage from a 1985 Canadian
parliamentary sub-committee report dealing with copyright reform, A
Charter of Rights for Creators :85
The Sub-Committee . . . takes the opportunity to assert that "ownership is ownership
is ownership." The copyright owner owns the intellectual works in the same sense
as a landowner owns land.
Unproved, indeed unprovable, assertions of this kind are endemic to
discussions of intellectual "property" .
In one sense, of course, these assertions are obviously untrue. One
does not see the Committee arguing that this "property" should attract
occupancy taxes, as real estate does, or sales tax, as transfers of tangible
property generally do .
In legal terms, too, the Committee is on weak ground . United States
courts have sometimes used the rhetoric and analogies of property law
when dealing with intellectual property, but United States policy advisers
have not always shared their views;86 nor have British Commonwealth
courts, which have generally refused to extend concepts of property unless
commanded by legislation.87 Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada has said
that neither copyright nor confidential information, though sharing charac-
teristics with traditional proprietary claims, should be classified as property
either in the civil or the criminal law.88
of reasonable royalties, is amongst the alternatives proposed in E.M. Jucker andB.A . Yorke,
The Protection of Industrial Property in Developing Countries, in AIPPI, op. cit., footnote
48, p. 151, at p. 166. Other possibilities, such as government subsidies encouraging local
subsidiaries of foreign corporations to do research work locally, may operate inequitably
for the local country:M.K. Berkowitz andY. Kotowitz, Patent Policy in an Open Economy
(1979), Working Paper #7926, Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto, pp. 24-
25 .
85 Report of the Sub-Committee on the Revision of Copyright, Standing Committee
on Communications and Culture, A Charter of Rights for Creators (1985, 1Vfinistry of
Supply & Services Canada), p. 9.
86 See, e.g., U.S . Congress, Office of Technological Assessment, op. cit., footnote 52.
87 See, e.g., in Australia, Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd v . Philip Morris Ltd, supra, footnote
7. Cf., in Canada, Consumers Distributing Co. Ltd v . Seiko Time Can. Ltd, [1984] 2
S.C.R. 583, at p. 596, (1984), 10 D.L.R. (4th) 161, at pp. 171-172: "Any expansion
of the common law principles to curtail the freedom to compete in the open market should
be cautiously approached. This must be the path of prudence in this age of the active
legislative branch where the community's trade policies are under almost continuous review."
But see, Vidéotron Ltée c. Industrie Microlec Produits Électroniques Inc., supra, footnote
7, at p. 549, holdingthe codeforscrambling pay-television signals to be confidential "propriété
intellectuelle" belonging to the television company.
ss Stewart v . The Queen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963, at p. 981, (1988), 50 D.L.R . (4th)
1, at p. 15 ("confidential information is not property"); Slavutych v . Baker, [1976] 1 S.C.R.
254; at p. 262, (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 224, at p. 230; LAC Minerals Ltd v. International
Corona Resources Ltd (1989), 61 D.L.R . (4th) 14, at p. 74 (S.C.C .) ("The foundation
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In economic terms, too, the language of property is ill-considered
here . The very fact that land is physical makes it a scarce resource : there
is only a finite amount of land on earth. Capitalist societies allocate property
in land and other commodities as a means of ensuring efficient use: the
person who values a property most will pay the most for it . Knowledge
is not a scarce resource. It is infinite in time and space. It can be used
by all without depleting its value. In fact, the more use, the more valuable
knowledge often is . Allocating property rights in knowledge makes ideas
artificially scarce and their use less frequent-and, from a social point
of view, less valuable .89
Indeed, the Committee's statement itself is unwittingly a paradox. It
is, of course, an unacknowledged borrowing of Gertrude Stein's famous
dictum : "a rose is a rose is a rose." Did the committee ask Stein's estate
for prior permission to use her aphorism in this way? Did it send a royalty
cheque? Will there nowbe a collecting society formed under the appellation
of "The Famous Writers' Famous Sayings' Collective"?
The fascinating thing is that the Committee presumably thought it
did no wrong in plagiarizing Stein-and it was no doubt legally correct.
But it ignored the implications of its act. "Creative geniuses" or "mere
mortals, we all borrow from one another. Art imitates life, life imitates
art, and writers imitate writers, as humans imitate other humans in all
spheres of life.90 The line where imitation becomes impermissible is one
drawn for social reasons.9 l It is not pre-ordained by natural law or otherwise .
ofthe action forbreach ofconfidence does not rest solely on oneofthe traditionaljurisdictional
bases for action of contract, equity or property. The action is sui generis relying on all
three . . .") ; Compo Co. Ltd v. Blue Crest Music Inc., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357, at p. 372,
(1979), 105 D.L.R. (3d) 249, at p. 281 ("copyright law is neither tort law nor property
law in classification, but is statutory law"). Cf., Marie Bourgeois, Protecting Business
Confidences : A Comparative Study of Quebec and French Law (1988), 3 I.P .J. 259.
89 See R.J . Roberts, Is Information Property? (1987), 3 I.P.J . 209; Douglas Smith,
Recent Proposals for Copyright Revision : An Evaluation (1988), 14 Can. Public Policy
(No. 2) 175; R.G. Hammond, The Misappropriation of Commercial Information in the
Computer Age (1986), 64 Can. Bar Rev. 342. See, more generally, Alan Carter, The
Philosophical Foundation of Property Rights (1989).
90 Cf., Kernan, loc. cit., footnote 30 : "Creativity and originality have come to seem
far more rare than once the case, while imitation appears increasingly inescapable . . . .
Originality is for [critic Harold] Bloom only a dream, which the modern artist, tormented
by an Oedipal need to create something new and different from the work of the fathers,
pursues in an endless `anxiety of influence'-never `certain precisely when he is quoting',
original only in the `belated' and self-conscious modem sense of misreading those whom
he unavoidably plagiarizes, making lucky mistakes when he is trying to copy them down,
and culpable only when he copies second-rate writers."
In Creativity: Genius and Other Myths (1986), Robert W. Weisberg goes even further :
"there may be no thinking except creative thinking, since our ordinary functioning involves
successful adaptation to novel situations, and thus meets the criteria for creativity": ibid.,
p. 147.
91 "Marking offboundaries in intellectual property is essentially a policy choice which
has major implications for innovation. Boundaries that are marked too broadly may impair
1990]
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Where it should be drawn is emphatically not answered by "ownership
is ownership is ownership" . Quite apart from their historical untruth,
bromides such as these seem curiously old-fashioned and unresponsive to
the problems of the modern technological revolution.
The Committee might better have borrowed from Gertrude Stein's
dying words. She said to her companion: "What is the answer?" Receiving
no reply, Stein then said: "In that case, what is the question?"
We know that the answer is not "ownership is ownership is ownership".
Nor is there just one question . If there is any truth to the proposition
that intellectual property is a form ofproperty, then there are several questions
to be asked, like :
Should society simply set up a market for ideas and allow entrants
in that market to sell those ideas to the highest bidder?
Should society be concerned about people who do not have the
resources to enter the market, or should their lack of means disentitle
them to the power that ideas can bring?
Should society be concerned about the unequal distribution of
intellectual property in the same way as it is concerned (or not concerned)
about the unequal distribution of traditional property? Or should we try
to devise intellectual property laws that do not entrench andenhance existing
distributions of power andwealth?92 1f we worry about the fact that twenty-
five corporations in Canada control thirty-five per cent of corporate assets,93
should we not also enquire about the existingpatterns of patent and copyright
concentration before we reach conclusions about whether or not it is desirable
to strengthen or weaken copyright or patent protection?
Should society be concerned that intellectual property laws may help
cause people to invest too much time and money in what the law calls
"inventive" and "creative" activity, to the detriment of more modest but
as worthwhile improvements to existing technology?94 Or that the laws
may contribute to new technology being introduced and exploited before
its potential social impacts can be fully and fairly assessed, because its
the ability of individuals to create, innovate, or improve upon the works ofothers. Boundaries
that are set too narrowly, or that fail to protect the most socially valuable aspects of
writings or inventions, may diminish the incentive to create or innovate. To promote science
and the useful arts, policymakers must strike an optimal balance between what belongs
to a creator and what belongs to the public domain." U.S . Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, op. cit., footnote 52, p. 61 .
92 Ibid., footnote 52, and accompanying text.
93 Alan Freeman, Free-Trade Pact Creates Winners, Losers, WallStreet Journal, Feb. 7,
1989, p. A14.
94 See, for example, Lewett, loc. cit., footnote -11, at p. 236: "Too much emphasis
on major inventions and `high technology' tends to obscure the fact that myriad new low
technology products and engineering improvements to existing products and processes may
contribute as much, particularly in the short run."
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promoters naturally want to reap the rewards of monopoly quickly? Or
that intellectual property laws may need to be modified or supplemented
to encourage activity in areas which society considers particularly necessary
for its well-being or survival and which those laws are doing little or
nothing to encourage?
In the heat of the battle between owners and users of inventions
and creations, questions such as these tend to be overlooked .
We should remember that copyright and patent laws are not isolated
and immutable pieces of legislation that, like Topsy, "just grow'd". They
are part of our social and economic policy-95 To the extent that our society
seeks some semblance of social justice, 96 intellectual property laws, as an
important and growing part of that vision, cannot escape scrutiny .
95 Any remaining doubts on this score must be stilled by the inclusion of intellectual
property provisions in the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement 1988 and in the
negotiations ofthe current Uruguay Round ofthe General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
96 A "commitment to social justice and equality" is, after all, claimed by the Chief
Justice of Canada, speaking for the court, as one of "the values and principles essential
to a free and democratic society": R. v. Oakes (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, at p. 225
(S .C .C .) .
